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Collaboration among regional/local governments becomes more important for successful 
local economic development. It has emerged as an alternative to traditional competition-based 
strategies for local economic development. This study explores the degree of collaboration 
among local governments in the partnership and its impacts on local economic performance, 
using nation-wide survey results of 112 local government partnerships for economic 
development in Korea. Factor analysis identifies three key factors for the degree of interlocal 
collaboration: (1) commitment to mutual relationships and goals, (2) the quality of 
communication to build consensus among participants, and (3) the effectiveness of formal joint 
meetings, as a sub-dimension of communication. The multivariate regressions of three factors on 
contextual attributes (resource dependence on partners and geographical proximity), relational 
attributes (social/political similarity, perceived competitive relation, and trust in partners), and 
institutional attribute (the level of institutionalization) report interesting findings. Trust in 
partners and the level of institutionalization for the partnership turn out to be the most important 
factors affecting the level of commitment and the quality of communication in collaboration 
processes. On the other hand, resource dependence on partners and geographical proximity 
positively affect only formal joint meeting operation. Using the Baron and Kenny’s three-step 
hierarchical regression analysis, this study finds that the degree of collaboration mediates the 
relationship between resource dependence, trust, and the level of institutionalization and local 
governments’ strategic performance. However, it does not show any associations with direct 
economic performance measures—i.e., effectiveness and efficiency of a collaborative project 
that might be more influenced by, and thus hardly disentangled from, other various external 
economic/political factors. It implies that although a high quality collaboration process cannot 
guarantee the success of project itself, it entails participants’ learning (i.e., accumulation of 
knowledge and experience) that may contribute to innovation and better economic performance 






Interlocal collaboration, both in decision-making and implementation, is widely adopted to 
deal with local fragmentation problems. Local governments increasingly face policy problems 
beyond jurisdictional boundaries (Frederickson, 1999; K. LeRoux, P. W. Brandenburger, & S. K. 
Pandey, 2010) such as common-pool resource management, externalities, and economies of scale 
(Steinacker, 2010). In the more integrated global economy than ever, interlocal collaboration has 
emerged as a more effective alternative to competition-based economic development strategies 
(Gordon, 2007; Wolfson & Frisken, 2000). Traditionally, the local economic development has 
been conceived as a competitive process in nature because local governments often compete 
each other to attract business and investment and to receive some assistance from state and 
federal (or central) government (Gordon, 2007; I. W. Lee, Feiock, & Lee, 2012). However, the 
competition approach has been criticized for the problems of inefficiency, negative externalities, 
inequity and less attention to regional competitiveness (Cleave & Arku, 2014). Olberding 
(Olberding, 2009) maintains that an interlocal collaborative decision-making strategy (e.g., 
regional partnership) for economic development has a greater potential to produce an optimal 
outcome as it can account for the benefits and costs of a decision to other local actors. The 
advocates of  “new regional administration,” pursuing integration into a fewer number of local 
governments, argue that local governments can take advantage of synergistic benefits when they 
recognize their interdependence and promote cooperation amongst themselves (Olberding, 
2002).  
The collaborative approach has been well accepted in the practice. Indeed, many local 
governments in the United States (U.S.) have founded diverse forms of collaborative 
development strategies for their regional economic development (I. W. Lee et al., 2012; 
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Olberding, 2009). As is the trend in other countries, the demand for more interlocal collaboration 
for economic development has increased in Korea as well (Jung, 2009; KALGS, 2008). In 
particular, since the introduction of local autonomy in 1995, the problem of inefficient 
regional/local development has been exacerbated due to vigorous competition among local 
governments (M. H. Kang, 2009) and incomplete devolution (K.-h. Kim, 2008; Y.-W. Kim, 
2011); as a result, there has been a growing need for interlocal collaboration in Korea.  
Responding to this trend toward collaboration in the practice, over the past decade there has 
been a good body of research on interlocal collaborative mechanism in the field of public 
management and urban development (e.g.,Agranoff & McGuire, 1998; Brown & Potoski, 2003; 
Feiock & Scholz, 2010; Frederickson, 1999; Krueger & McGuire, 2005; Kelly LeRoux, Paul W. 
Brandenburger, & Sanjay K. Pandey, 2010; Thurmaier & Wood, 2002). However, despite the 
increased importance of interlocal collaboration, relatively little attention has been paid to the 
degree of collaboration among participants and its outcomes. Some studies on interlocal 
collaboration for economic development (e.g.,Agranoff & McGuire, 1998; Andersen & Pierre, 
2010; Feiock, Steinacker, & Park, 2009; I. W. Lee et al., 2012) speak to the question about what 
factors make local governments opt to collaborate for economic development (i.e., whether to 
collaborate or not). However, they do not address what affects the degree of collaboration among 
participants in collaborative decision-making and implementation and how the degree of 
collaboration affects economic development performance. Furthermore, prior literature on 
interlocal collaboration for economic development has been developed primarily through case 
studies focusing on a few partnerships, perhaps due to lack of extensive, nation-wide datasets. 
Particularly, a great majority of studies on intergovernmental or interlocal collaboration for 
economic development in Korea have dealt with a specific case (e.g.,Bang, 2011; Han, 2006; Y. 
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Kang, 2004; Oh & Kim, 2008). While the case studies focusing on the observation of a few 
partnerships allow researchers to investigate in more details, they cannot generalize the results to 
the wider population. To fill this void, this study uses a nation-wide dataset of interlocal 
collaboration for economic development in Korea. From the data, it attempts to identify major 
factors affecting the collaborative process among participants and outcomes and draw the 
generalized conclusion regarding what makes interlocal economic partnerships work well. 
Specifically, this study addresses the following sets of research questions. First, what are the 
facilitators of collaboration in interlocal partnerships for economic development? According to 
Krueger and McGuire (2005), different incentives faced by each local government explain why 
certain local governments collaborate better than others. In particular, this research considers 
three dimensions affecting the degree of collaboration among actors in the collaborative process: 
(1) contextual attributes that are given to potential local collaborators in terms of the demand for 
resources and the population they serve, (2) relational attributes of individual local officials 
engaged in interlocal economic development projects, and (3) institutional attributes of the legal 
devices that are devised for a partnership operation. This study attempts to explain the 
relationships between these attributes and the degree or intensity of collaboration, primarily 
through the theoretical lenses of resource dependency theory, collective action theory, and 
transaction costs theory.     
Second, does a greater degree of collaboration among actors in partnerships produce better 
performance of economic development? What elements of collaboration are more crucial to 
economic performance? Prior research in collaboration or network approaches illustrates the 
outcomes of better or intense collaboration. For instance, Capello (2000) shows the positive 
relationship between the degree of connectivity to a network in a city and urban performance. In 
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particular, she finds that more serious participation in a city network and more intense use of the 
network with cooperative behavior lead to greater urban performance in terms of successful 
urban policies implemented through sharing know-how on a growth strategy from the network. 
However, the evidence of the positive impact of collaboration on a successful collaborative 
outcome does not provide a holistic view for the complete chain of relationships among the 
collaboration facilitators, the degree of collaboration and collaboration outcome. There is scant 
empirical evidence of the relationships among them. To fill the void, this research examines 
whether the degree of collaboration, as a mediator, is affected by collaboration facilitation 
factors and then has any effects on performance. Specifically, it employs Baron and Kenny’s 
approach (1986), which examines the mediating effects on the relationship between independent 
variables and dependent variables.  
To that end, this study begins with the rationale for interlocal collaboration for economic 
development in Korea. Next, it sets out testable hypotheses regarding the relationships among 
three sets of attributes (antecedents), the degree of collaboration (mediator), and economic 
performance (outcomes). Then, it provides the details of the research methods including survey 
procedure, sample and measures. Lastly, it presents the results of empirical analyses, and 
concludes with a discussion of the findings and their implications for future research.  
2. Local Government Collaboration for Economic Development in Korea  
Interlcoal collaboration is often considered as a plausible solution to problems created by 
local government fragmentation: diseconomies of scale, negative externalities, and common pool 
resource problems (Steinacker, 2010). In particular, for regional/local economic development, 
interlocal collaboration is necessary to maximize economies of scale and obtain the synergistic 
benefits of interdependence. Regional partnerships have the potential to achieve a more optimal 
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outcome that is greater than a sum of each local individual outcomes (Olberding, 2009). 
Furthermore, in an era of fast technological change, a network among territorial partners allows 
them to acquire locally unavailable know-how and to enhance local innovation capacities 
(Capello, 2000). These advantages provide the general rationale for local collaboration. In 
particular, Korea is in greater need of an interlocal collaboration strategy for economic 
development for the following reasons.  
First, since the introduction of local autonomy in 1995, the competitiveness of regional 
economic development in Korea rather has been challenged as conflicts among local 
governments increase. The demand for grass roots democracy has increased among Koreans 
since the first civilian president after the military coup of 1961 was elected in 1992, and 
accordingly decentralization and devolution initiatives have been suggested as an integral part of 
local autonomy. However, since the election for governors, mayors, and county executives in 
1995, conflicts among local governments have been amplified because local autonomy inevitably 
generated a horizontal, competitive structure among local governments who seek to maximize 
their authorities and profits as an economic agent (M. H. Kang, 2009). According to Korea 
Public Administration DB Center (2006), a total of 88 interlocal conflict cases—NIMBY (short 
for “Not-in-My-Backyard”) (15), PIMBY (for “Please-in-My-Backyard”) (15), jurisdiction 
dispute (22) and authority dispute (25)—were reported for the first eight years of local autonomy 
(i.e., between 1995 and 2003). In particular, these conflicts likely emerge and intensify while 
small local autonomous governments compete for a same development project, pursuing their 
own interests with the greater cause for socially optimal outcomes ignored. Therefore, in the era 
of local autonomy, local government collaboration strategy in Korea is more needed to overcome 
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conflicts among fragmented local government and enhance regional competitiveness through 
economies of scale.        
Second, even though 244 local governments have obtained their own authorities to make 
policies, lack of experiences, knowledge, and institutions for effective local economic 
developments led to low economic performance. With the inauguration of the Lee Myung-Bak 
administration in 2008, the government established the principle of interregional/interlocal 
cooperation as a new vehicle for regional development policies. It aims to enhance local/regional 
competitiveness through effective self-reliant localization polices, emphasizing the roles of the 
central government only as a coordinator rather than an implementer or controller (Choe, 2011). 
However, Korea is still developing the practice of local autonomy, and individual local 
governments lack the capability to implement comprehensive economic development (K.-h. 
Kim, 2008; Y.-W. Kim, 2011). Despite the considerable progress in devolving authority to local 
governments, the central government still owns substantial authorities over local finance and 
taxation and local government’s organization (S.-C. Lee, 2006), which are critical to implement 
local economic development projects. For example, the central government remains to be the 
principal decision-maker in designating special economic zones, transferring development rights 
to private sectors, and laying out the requirement of investor in regional development. Given the 
situation, interlocal collaboration becomes more important for local governments with limited 
resources, institutions, or innovation capacities. Collaboration among them may contribute to 
greater competitiveness of participating local governments, by sharing their individual 
experience and know-how related to successful project management and technology innovation.  
3. Theoretical Review and Hypotheses Development 
3.1. Factors Influencing the Degree of Local Government Collaboration 
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This section identifies major factors affecting the degree of collaboration among local 
governments in collaboration processes, based on the following literature. First, it is rooted in the 
overarching framework of collaborative governance that include antecedents, collaborative 
processes, and outcomes (e.g.,Ansell & Gash, 2008; Innes & Booher, 1999; Thomson & Perry, 
2006; Wood & Gray, 1991). The review of the prior literature on a theoretical framework for 
successful collaborative governance identifies common factors that can be applicable to the case 
of interlocal partnerships for economic development. Second, it identifies potential factors that 
may affect the degree of collaboration in the context of interlocal development partnerships 
through reviewing the prior literature on regional development partnerships (e.g.,Feiock et al., 
2009; Krueger & McGuire, 2005; Olberding, 2002, 2009), which suggests the importance of 
local contexts for partnership formation or effectiveness. They can be largely classified into three 
broader types of factors: (a) physical/contextual attributes including resource dependence on 
partners and geographical proximity; (b) relational attributes among participants including 
social/political homophily among local agencies, perceived competition with partners, and trust 
in partners; and (c) an institutional attribute regarding the level of institutionalization for a 
partnership.  
3.1.1. Physical/Contextual Attributes 
Resource Dependence  
According to resource dependency theory, the interlocal activities emerge when individual 
local governments have needs for resources from others to achieve their interests (Cook, 1977; 
Van de Ven, 1976). For example, when a local government suffers from insufficient resources—
in terms of the kind or the amount—to implement public services or economic development 
projects independently, a likely solution to the problem is to seek other local governments that 
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are in a similar situation and, more importantly, have common interests, and are willing to share 
the costs and benefits (Krueger & McGuire, 2005).  Collaboration may arise on a relative 
resource dependence basis even without lack of resources. In particular, local governments may 
be willing to collaborate with the partner to a greater degree when they place a huge value on the 
potential partner’s resources, such as  financial or human resources and managerial capacity, in 
terms of the expected contribution of the partners’ resources to their own local economic 
development (Kwon & Lee, 2010). To summarize, as a local government is more dependent on 
other governments’ resources either (a) due to the lack of necessary resources or (b) due to 
greater usefulness or attractiveness of others’ resources, it will pursue a higher degree of 
collaboration with partners. This leads to H1a: 
H1a: The degree of collaboration is positively associated with resource 
dependence on partner 
 
Geographical Proximity: Similarity in Population 
Conceivably, neighboring local governments may well have much in common in geo-
political and geo-economic characteristics.1 Among others, they serve population of similar 
characteristics. They may serve even the same population when there are high traffic of 
commutes, for work, school, and even for shopping, between adjacent communities. The similar 
characteristics shared among the population and the frequent interactions and movements of the 
population builds highly inter-connected social relationships. Even from economic standpoint, 
neighboring towns likely share major products, local specialties, and industries, which enforces 
the importance of the inter-connectedness and the common needs of the population served by the 
                                                            
1 Similarities in terms of economic, social, and political characteristics among local government officials will be 
discussed as part of social/political homophily in the following section. 
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neighboring towns. In sum, the similarities in characteristics of the population increases a 
demand for partnerships as a means to serve the common population more effectively and 
efficiently. In this regard, the physical proximity may affect behaviors in collaboration with 
neighboring local governments. Based on the information cost approach, Feiock, Steinacker and 
Park (2009) argue that proximity allows neighboring cities to be more knowledgeable of each 
other and to establish trust among themselves and therefore makes reputation more important. In 
other words, since neighboring cities had more interaction opportunities or experiences in the 
past, dealing with policy and administration issue together, they can reduce the information costs 
associated with collaboration and thus increase the efficiency of collaborative efforts. It leads to 
H1b: 
H1b: The degree of collaboration is positively associated with the physical 
proximity between local governments. 
 
3.1.2. Relational Attributes 
Social/Political Similarity of Local Government Officials 
The homophily principle—“similarity breeds connection”—structures network ties of every 
type (McPherson, Smith-Lovin, & Cook, 2001:415). It supports the argument that people tend to 
be connected to others who are like themselves, with respect to socio-demographic and 
behavioral characteristics. For example, people tend to make social connections with others of 
the same age, ethnicity, education, social class and/or religion. ‘Social influence’ coming from 
similarity (Fiss, 2006) has the impact of the strength of connection, for instance, by reducing 
information costs. Following the argument about the effects of social homophily, this study 
contends that local governments with greater similarity in, for example, political opinion and 
demographics such as hometown, school ties, job background and college major of their 
12 
 
employees may collaborate to a greater degree than the other types. Among others, prior 
literature has paid attention to the effects of political homophily, a tendency to form connections 
with others who are politically similar (Gerber, Henry, & Lubell, 2013). In a similar vein, 
Feiock, Steinacker and Park (2009) argue that heterogeneity of participants in economic and 
demographic characteristics (including political strengths) makes allocation of aggregate gains 
more difficult and accordingly increases the likelihood of political opposition, if any, to 
cooperative solutions. In Korea it has been recognized that homogeneity in political opinions 
among participating local governments is an important determinant of whether to collaborate or 
not as well as the intensity of collaborative relationship. Although there is little research on the 
direct relationship between similarity of political opinions and collaboration among regions in 
Korea, inter-regional hostilities occurring based on political/ideological positions have been 
blamed for undermining the minimum consensus necessary for administrative functions (M.-C. 
Kim & Park, 1991). Therefore: 
H1c: The degree of collaboration is positively associated with the social/political 
similarity of local officials. 
 
Perceived Competition   
The perception of other local governments, or how other local governments perceive the 
qualities of a government, affect interaction between them (Gordon, 2007). Among many 
qualities, the following hypothesis pertains to the type of relationship in pursuing local 
governments’ goals: a competitor or a cooperator. So to speak, whether to view them as 
competitors or as cooperators may influence the collaborative behaviors. Olberding (2002: 481) 
classifies intrelocal relations into two types: interjurisdictional competition and regionalism. The 
interjurisdictional competition model, consistent with Tiebout’s (1956) description, focuses on 
the competitive nature of interlocal relationships for economic development. The model 
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illustrates the competition among cities to attract residents and businesses through which 
efficient public goods provision can be achieved. However, competition is a double-edged 
sword. On the one hand, as discussed, competition helps to produce the optimal level of public 
services that maximizes benefits provided to residents and businesses at the lowest costs (the 
lowest overall tax rate) (Tiebout, 1956). On the other hand, an intense competition does more 
harm than good, impeding collaboration among cities. Kreuger and McGuire (2005) provide two 
reasons why local governments in a competitive relationship are reluctant to be engaged in 
collaboration: (a) concerns about unequal distribution of benefits from collaboration, and (b) 
probable opportunistic behaviors of collaborator. They argue that collaboration of competing 
agencies rarely produces equal gains and thus provides incentives for local governments to act 
opportunistically—to get more relative gains. In particular, despite likely absolute gains, 
competitors may not opt to collaborate because, in a competition, unequal benefits (i.e., non-zero 
relative gains) may create differential competitiveness (i.e., the loss of competitive balance).   
In contrast, the regionalism model suggests a different perspective that stresses the positive 
functions of social and economic ties among local governments. From this perspective, when 
local governments recognize their interdependence, again due to their inter-connectedness, they 
tend to act in a cooperative manner which results in more desirable outcomes including 
economy-of-scale benefits (Olberding 2002). Under the circumstances, transaction costs 
associated with monitoring partners’ opportunistic behavior are likely low. Therefore, local 
governments, even in competition, may choose to collaborate and further exert efforts to an 
extent during collaboration. However, concerned about unequal gains from collaboration, local 
governments in competition may make less commitment to collaboration than those in 
cooperative and, thus, less competitive relationships. In sum, this is a reason to believe that more 
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intense competition decreases local governments’ commitment to collaboration. The following 
hypothesis is derived from this logic:   
H1d: The degree of collaboration is negatively (positively) associated with the 
perceived competition (cooperation). 
 
Trust in Partners 
Social capital, as “an asset that accumulates as a result of trust and mutual favors,” (Kelly 
LeRoux et al., 2010:270) plays a critical role in inducing more collaborative interactions among 
partners (P. J. Robertson, 2006). As in the definition of social capital, trust constitutes an 
important dimension of social capital2 (Maurer, Bartsch, & Ebers, 2011) and is often considered 
as a critical relationship-based capital of a collaborative partnership that, thus, has an indirect 
impact on the partnership’s performance (Sarkar, Echambadi, Cavusgil, & Aulakh, 2001).3 More 
importantly, social network theorists believe that trust, professional disciplines, and norms of 
reciprocity which are embedded in human relations can aid to reduce transaction costs involving 
collective actions (Jones, Hesterly, & Borgatti, 1997; Kelly LeRoux et al., 2010; Thurmaier & 
Wood, 2002). 
Trust affects a collaborative process in two ways. On the one hand, trust among 
collaborators reduces barriers of collaboration such as complexity and transaction costs (Ostrom, 
1998; Thomson & Perry, 2006). Therefore, lower transaction costs associated with collaboration 
improves the efficiency of collaboration and in turn facilitate collaboration. On the other hand, it 
should be noted that trust and collaboration are in reciprocal relationships. The more and better 
collaborations can help to build trust which, in turn, facilitates more faithful collaboration. 
                                                            
2 It is defined as “the sum of the actual and potential resources embedded within and derived from the network of 
relationships possessed by an individual or social unit” (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998:243); that is, social capital can 
be created through social network. 
3 Sarkar et al. (200) use the term, alliance, instead of partnership. 
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Ostrom (1998) suggests reciprocity, trust, and reputation as three key core factors leading to a 
collective action. Consistently, Ring and Van de Ven (1994) describe the development of 
reciprocity-based interaction among collaborative partners, through reputation building, and 
finally to trust-based collaboration. Underscoring the intensity of the implicit relationship, they 
even liken the trust-based relationship to ‘institutionalized psychological contracts’ (Ring & Van 
de Ven, 1994). In sum, the discussion boils down to the importance of trust in developing a high 
quality collaboration and leads to the following the hypothesis:  
H1e: The degree of collaboration is positively associated with the level of trust in 
partners. 
 
3.1.3. Institutional Attribute 
The Level of Institutionalization  
Institutional arrangements shorten (or even remove) the processes unnecessary for 
productive negotiation and bargaining, set the allocation rules for incidences and responsibilities, 
and regulate the enforcement of the agreed-upon rules. Thereby, institutional arrangements 
enable collaboration to work well for collectively beneficial outcomes (Steinacker, 2004). Rules 
define means to cope with collective action problems participants seeking to collaborate 
encounter. In this sense, the level of institutionalization of institutional arrangement will be a 
crucial factor affecting the degree of collaboration among participants.  
The level of institutionalization can be figured out through whether rules regarding the 
collaborative decision-making process, implementation and monitoring are specific and stable. 
For example, operational rules, which define “who can participate, what the participants may, 
must, or must not do, and how they will be rewarded or punished” (Tang, 1991:43), can be tools 
of allocating resources and managing collaboration in a predictable and efficient manner. 
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Specifying rules in advance, for example, regarding decision authorities and constraints, roles 
and responsibilities, the access of necessary information, the distribution of costs and benefits 
can reduce conflicts and practically govern the collaboration processes for joint decision-making 
(Ostrom, 1990; Thomson & Perry, 2006; Thomson, Perry, & Miller, 2009). Whether and how 
clearly these rules are constructed can affect cooperative actions among participants; in other 
words, well-constructed rules will facilitate cooperative actions among participants, resolving 
collective action problems.  
Furthermore, the degree of sophistication of institutions that govern local government 
collaboration practice may affect transaction costs associated with collaborative decision-making 
and implementation. A high level of institutionalization, defined as well-defined rules and 
regulations, reduces the likelihood of frictions due to incomplete prescriptions and helps to 
overcome potential problems arising from high structural complexity (Van de Ven, 1976). Thus, 
it lowers transaction costs involving frictions and complexity. Moreover, under circumstances 
where well-defined institutions and technology can contribute to low transaction costs, 
individuals are willing to be engaged in exchange or cooperation. In this regard, well-defined 
institutional arrangements play an important role in enforcing and facilitating collective actions. 
To summarize, the level of institutionalization is expected to be in a negative relationship with 
transaction costs and in a positive relationship with collaboration among participants. It leads to 
the following hypothesis: 
H1f: The degree of collaboration is positively associated with the level of 
institutionalization. 
 
3.2. The Degree of Collaboration and Performance 
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Local governments collaborate, despite potential high transaction costs associated with 
collaborative process, anticipating better outcomes than they could have achieved individually. 
Benefits from collaboration include the following. First, collaborative decision-making enables 
parties to account for benefits and costs expected to impact not only themselves but other parties 
(i.e., externalities) from the beginning (Olberding, 2009). It can save potential social welfare loss 
that may arise from suboptimal decisions made by self-interested, albeit interdependent, actors. 
This, inversely speaking, suggests the potential to reach a more, if not first-best, optimal solution 
where society-wide net benefits are higher (Olberding, 2002, 2009). In this regard, the collective 
action perspective provides an intuitive reason for independent actors to opt for a collaboration 
strategy; they collaborate to obtain higher joint benefits or reduce joint harm (i.e., greater 
positive externalities and fewer negative externalities) (Ostrom, 1990).  
Second, collaborative planning processes pursue solutions that may serve common interests 
of all partners. According to Frame, Gunton, and Day (2004), a collaborative planning process 
produces agreements that are in general easier to implement and more durable because a wide 
spectrum of interests are considered throughout the process. Therefore, a successful collaborative 
process is likely to resolve potential conflicts among collaboration partners (Frame, Gunton, & 
Day, 2004). 
Third, a high-quality collaborative process can produce positive side-effects. Agreements 
are often considered as a primary objective of collaborative processes. However, in many cases, 
collaborative processes go beyond reaching agreements. They build shared intellectual capital, 
mutual understanding, trust, and social capital that may lead to more fundamental systemic 
change (Innes & Booher, 1999).  In other words, these by-products from good collaborative 
processes, in fact, increase the collaboration participants’ capacity to achieve better performance. 
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High-quality collaboration enables the dynamic processes of consensus building, 
implementation, assessment and adaptation and, in turn, allows a collaborative system to sustain 
and adapt to change and even to generate higher levels of performance (Innes & Booher, 1999). 
In this regard, Connick and Innes (2003) understand collaborative policy dialogue as a complex 
evolving system, in which a high-quality dialogue produces persistent mutual relationships, 
practices and norms through a learning process. 
Prior research on collaborative planning or collaborative governance contends that a good 
consensus building model produces high-quality outcomes (Booher & Innes, 2002; Innes & 
Booher, 1999; Margerum, 2002). Margerum (2002), in line with the idea, suggests that an 
important factor affecting the effectiveness of collaborative governance is the quality of the 
collaborative process. There arise questions regarding the quality of collaboration; what are the 
criteria to evaluate collaborative process or how do we determine the quality of collaboration? 
This study evaluates a collaborative process with the concept of the degree of collaboration. In 
particular, the degree of collaboration indicates how well participants collaborate or how actively 
participants are engaged in collaborative process. Prior literature on collaborative governance 
(Ansell & Gash, 2008; Thomson & Perry, 2006) and collaborative planning (Connick & Innes, 
2003; Healey, 1997; Innes & Booher, 1999) suggests some aspects of collaborative processes 
that are indicative of the degree of interlocal collaboration. They fall in two broad categories, 
communication and commitment.  
First, the element of communication can affect the capacity of partnerships to achieve their 
economic development goals. Good collaborative processes seek to build consensus through 
communication and mutual interaction among parties (Healey, 1997; Innes & Booher, 1999). 
Communication will be assessed in terms of three components: face-to-face dialogue, consensus 
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building discussion, and information exchange. A face-to-face dialogue is the most unavoidable 
and effective communication mode; as a result, it allows the “thick communication” that is 
necessary for parties in communication to identify opportunities for mutual gains (Ansell & Gash 
2007:16).  Therefore, a face-to-face dialogue establishes the basis for a strong tie between the 
parties, “building trust, mutual respect, shared understanding, and commitment to the process” 
(Ansell & Gash 2007:16). The richer communication, accordingly, helps a good consensus 
building process because it allows thorough, if not complete, investigation of the issues and 
conflicts of interests in pursuit of creative resolutions (Ansell & Gash 2007; Innes & Booher 
1999).  In addition, effective information exchange helps convey documents gathered and 
transmit knowledge, and ultimately facilitate a shared understanding. In these ways, such 
communication modes help increase the effectiveness of interloccal collaboration for local 
economic development.  
Second, the element of commitment to the collaborative process involves the time or efforts 
invested in collaboration. Broadly speaking, being defined as an obligation that arises from 
frequent interaction and denotes an intention to engage in future action (Coleman, 1990), 
commitment is seen as an important determinant leading to individuals’ some activities in a 
future context (Coleman, 1990; Nahapiet & Ghoshal, 1998). The actors making the commitment 
can be not only individual persons but also organizations and thus it can be made either at an 
individual or an organizational level. In the context of collective action, Robertson and Tang 
(1995) argue that individuals’ higher commitment toward a collective goal contributes to an 
effective collective action system. Further, in their analysis of the role of commitment in 
collective actions, they compare two different perspectives—organizational behavior and the 
rational choice. From the organizational behavior perspective, one’s psychological attachment to 
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the organization would be the most important factor for developing collective action systems. On 
the other hand, the rational choice perspective emphasizes objective conditions that prevent an 
individual from reneging on a promise. However, in spite of these differences, both share the 
underlying notion that individual parties’ greater commitment to a shared goal drives the 
individuals towards a collaborative action in pursuit of the collective end (Robertson & Tang 
1995).  
It should be also noted that a higher-level of commitment to a collaborative process entails 
mutually beneficial relationships. Based on several case studies, Ansell and Gash (2007) find 
that greater commitment increases shared understanding among parties of different interests, and 
accordingly leads to a greater likelihood of conflict resolution and higher responsiveness to the 
demands of partner. In a similar vein, Burger et al. (2001) also point out the role of commitment 
in developing strong relationships among partners based on a good faith in the process of 
bargaining for mutual gains and its contribution to a success of the partnership.  
Accordingly, this study expects that a greater degree of collaboration leads to a higher 
performance. Considering those antecedents of the degree of collaboration discussed previously, 
the following hypothesis tests its mediating effects on the relationship between factors 
influencing the degree of collaboration and economic performance: 
H2: The performance of interlocal collaboration for economic development is 
positively associated with the degree of collaboration among participants in 
the collaborative process.  
 
 
Based on the discussion so far, Figure 4 illustrates the relationships among the key 
constructs of the research, and provides the research framework. 
[   Figure 1 about here  ] 
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4. Research Method 
The empirical analysis of this study involves three stages. First, an extensive survey was 
carried out with local officials at the upper level (i.e., metropolitan cities and provinces) and at 
the lower level (i.e., cities and counties) of local governments in Korea. Second, the original 
survey questionnaire items are reduced to a manageable set of underlying factors with factor 
analysis.4 It produces a meaningful classification for three segments of research model: factors 
representing physical/contextual, relational, and institutional attributes for independent variables; 
the degree of collaboration for a mediator; and performance in different aspects for dependent 
variables. Third, multivariate regressions examine the relationships between three sets of 
attributes and the degree of collaboration (H1). Then, the Baron and Kenny’s three-step 
hierarchical regression approach (1986) is adopted to test the mediating effect of the degree of 
collaboration on the relationship between three sets of attributes and the performance of 
collaboration (H2). The following sections discuss each of these stages in detail. 
4.1. Survey Procedure and Sample 
4.1.1. Target Group Identification 
The survey population comprises local officials in charge of or engaged in any type of 
interlocal partnerships for economic development purposes in Korea that either have been 
recently completed or are operating as of the end of 2012. Identifying a target group for data 
collection was a challenging task as there existed no single listing that contains the complete list 
of local partnerships to the point. Accordingly, I searched for available listings of interlocal 
                                                            
4 Generally, factor analysis is divided into two types: exploratory factor analysis and confirmatory factor analysis. 
The former attempts to reduce a set of original variables into a smaller set of underlying “factors.” The latter posits 
that there are the underlying factors for a set of original variables and then test a specific hypothesis that certain 
variables belong to one factor, while others belong to the other factor (Kim and Mueller 1978). This study 
conducted confirmatory factor analysis. 
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partnerships for economic development in Korea that either have been recently completed or are 
operating as of 2012. The search process includes the multiple requests of information disclosure 
to central and local governments via the Korea Government Information Disclosure Portal 
(http://wonmun.open.go.kr). As a result, a comprehensive list was developed and it identifies a 
total of 112 interlocal partnerships for economic development5 in 94 local government (38.8 
percent of the local governments in Korea).6 
Once the list of partnerships was complied, I prepared the list of contacts for local officials 
who are in charge of, or engaged in the identified partnerships. To develop the contacts, I 
searched for a table of job assignment, or any similar information, available at the websites of the 
94 local governments and their collaborative agencies including seven Regional Development 
Committees (Capital, Chungchung, Honam, Gangwon, Daegyeong, Dongnam, and Jeju regions). 
If no information is available online, I made phone calls to local governments to acquire the 
contacts of in-charge officials. In cases that particular local officials engaged in the partnership 
could not be identified despite such effort, the heads of sections or departments which likely 
handle the partnership were added to the mailing list. Through these procedures, the list of 300 
local officials was finally identified as a target group for the survey.   
4.1.2. Sample 
Based on the list, 300 questionnaires were distributed to the local officials in each of the 94 
local governments in November, 2013. Of the 300 questionnaires distributed, 121 questionnaires 
                                                            
5 The partnerships are operated by three types of institutional arrangements -Local Government Association (LGA), 
Administration Consultative Council (ACC) and Partnership Contract (PC). While LGA and ACC need to form an 
organization for collaboration, PC is a functional collaboration without organization formation. 
6 Ministry of Security and Public Administration in Korea (MOSPA) released the handbook of 2013 Regional/Local 
Government Administration providing the listings of interlocal partnerships based on institutional arrangement 
forms on February in 2014 (http://www.mospa.go.kr). The listing of interlocal partnerships for economic 
development reported in the handbook are almost identical to mine.  
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were returned and 19 of them were incomplete. Therefore, 102 completed questionnaires were 
used for statistical analysis, resulting in the effective total response rate of 34 percent.  
[   Table 1 about here  ] 
The general demographic characteristics of the 102 respondents are shown in Table 1. The 
institutional arrangement composition of the sample departs somewhat from that of the 
population, with a higher proportion of respondents of Local Government Associations (LGAs) 
(32.3 vs. 15.7 percent) and a lower proportion of PCs (Partnership Contracts) (55.9 vs. 73.6 
percent). However, the proportion of respondents of Administrative Consultative Councils 
(ACCs) was almost equivalent to that of the population (11.8 vs. 10.7 percent)7. Almost three 
quarters of the respondents are in their 40’s and more. Approximately 73 percent of the 
responses come from middle-ranked officials (Grade 6 and Grade 7)8 who are working at a 
hands-on level. The respondents, on average, have been engaged in an interlocal partnership 
slightly longer than two years; the average length of service for the partnership is 29.7 months. 
These findings indicate that the respondents are experienced and well knowledgeable of their 
tasks. In addition, the table shows that 55.9 percent of the total respondents are from an upper-
level local government (i.e., Province or Metropolitan City), which suggests that the responses 
are well balanced between the two levels of local governments.    
4.2. Measures 
                                                            
7 The high response rate of LGA can be attributed to its organizational nature; all local officials in an LGA work 
together in one physical location, while those officials in the other forms of partnerships are geographically 
dispersed. Once a contact in an LGA is established it is easier to collect survey responses from the local officials 
working together. For example, it allowed even the respondents of LGA who were not in the survey list to be 
encouraged by their colleagues and supervisors to participate in this survey. Despite the overrepresentation of 
LGA, no weighting procedure was applied because (1) the exact population of local officials engaged in interlocal 
collaborative projects is hardly identifiable, and (2) the unit of analysis of this study is an individual local official’s 
response. 
8 The civil service program in Korea is composed of nine grades (Grade 1 is a highest position).  
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The survey questions were constructed based on an extensive review of theoretical and 
empirical literature as well as in-depth interviews with six experts in Korea. In particular, the 
interviews provided practical insights into how the interlocal partnerships operate in Korea, 
ensuring that my survey items are solidly grounded in reality. The questionnaire includes the 
items about (1) demographics of a respondent, (2) descriptive information about the interlocal 
partnership in which a respondent is engaged, and (3) research variables that are designed to 
capture the constructs of my research interest. For most questions, responses are structured in a 
Likert-type scale ranging from 1= “not at all” to 5= “to a great extent.” The questions regarding 
the effectiveness and efficiency of collaboration ask for ratio scale responses.  
Table 2 summarizes all the constructs and their measurement used in this study, matched 
with variables. Most of the variables are measured primarily with survey questions, except for 
geographical proximity (GEOPROXI), social/political similarity (SOCPOLSIMIL), local economic 
status (UNEMPLOY), and the significance of a partnership (IMPORTANCE) which are 
calculated with public data.  
[   Table 2 about here  ] 
This study applies factor analysis to establish convergence and divergence validities the 
survey questions, mapping them into the underlying, primarily theory-driven constructs. Factors 
are identified within each of three segments: antecedents, mediators, and outcomes. They are 
basically equivalent to independent, mediating, and dependent variables respectively in the 
research model. However, non-survey measures (i.e., the variables of GEOPROXI and 
SOCPOLSIMIL) and survey measures in a scale other than a Liker-type (the variables 
of %ACHIEVED and EFFICIENT) are not considered in the factor analysis. Overall, the 
outcomes confirm that survey questions are prepared appropriately to capture intended 
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constructs, showing convergences among variables of a construct and divergences between those 
of different constructs. Then, the factor analysis generates factor scores, as the product sum of 
the factor loadings and the original scale of observed variables.9 They constitute the latent 
variables, or “factors,” that are used in subsequent statistical analyses.  
[   Table 3 about here  ] 
Table 3 summarizes the results of the factor analysis.10 Panels A, B, and C represent the 
three segments of independent variables (i.e., antecedents), mediator, and dependent variables 
(i.e., outcomes). First, Panel A shows that regarding antecedents of collaboration, four factors are 
extracted: resource dependence (IF1_RESDEPEND), perceived competition (IF2_COMPET), 
trust in partners (IF3_TRUST), and the level of institutionalization (IF4_INSTITUTION). Three 
factors have moderate to high Cronbach’s alpha coefficients: IF1_RESDEPEND (.51), 
IF3_TRUST (.92), and IF4_INSTITUTION (.91). Second, Panel B indicates that three factors 
for mediators are identified: commitment to mutual relationships and goals 
(MF1_COMMITMENT), quality of general communication (MF2_QUAL_COMM), and 
effectiveness of formal joint group meetings, as a sub-dimension of communication 
(MF3_GROUPMEET). The three factors have Cronbach’s alpha coefficients of .94, .93 and .89 
respectively. Third, the factor analysis with the variables of collaboration performance is run 
separately for two conceptually distinctive constructs: the contribution to the development of 
local economy (i.e., economic contribution) and the contribution to the growth of organizational 
                                                            
9 Factor score is computed with the Thurstone’s regression approach (Thurstone, 1935). 
10 The approach of Varimax orthogonal rotation with Kaiser normalization is used because it attempts to minimize 
the number of variables that have high loadings on each factor and results in solutions that are easier to interpret 
and to report (Pallant 2013). Prior to performing factor analysis, testing the suitability of data for factor analysis 
reveals that the data meets conventional standard for factor analysis with the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) values 




capacity (i.e., capacity growth).11 Panel 3 shows that each of the factor analysis produces one 
factor. One (DF1_PERFORM) is for the performance in economic terms, while the other 
(DF2_PERFORM) is for the performance in organization perspectives. The high Cronbach’s 
alphas (.88 and .92) indicate that the constituent variables in each variable reliably and 
consistently capture the intended constructs. 
In sum, the table suggests that the design of multiple measurements is generally successful. 
In particular, the factor analysis maps variables into constructs in a consistent manner as they are 
discussed in theory; grouping similar variables into a construct and distinguishing different 
variables between constructs.  
5. Empirical Analysis and Finding  
5.1. Factors Influencing the Degree of Collaboration 
Bivariate correlations among the research variables suggest potential antecedents of the 
degree of collaboration (Table 4). First, trust in partners (IF3_TRSUT) and the level of 
institutionalization (IF4_INSTITUTION) are positively correlated with two factors of the degree 
of collaboration (MF1_COMMITMENT and MF2_QUAL_COMM). Second, interestingly, the 
socio-political similarities among the heads of local governments in a partnership 
(SOCPOLSIMIL) show negative, albeit insignificant or weakly significant, correlations with the 
factors for the degree of collaboration. It is the opposite of the prediction that greater similarities 
facilitates collaboration. Third, the other dimension of the degree of collaboration, or the 
                                                            
11 The factor analysis including all the strategic performance variables results in a single factor. Indeed, the 
economic performance and the organizational growth are found to be highly correlated. Despite the statistical 
output, as they are developed as distinctive constructs, the following analyses report the results adopting the two-
factor approach. The single factor for the performance of collaboration is also tried, but it does not yield 
meaningful differences in the analyses.  
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effectiveness of communication through formal meetings (MF3_GROUPMEET), is associated 
only with resource dependence (IF_RESDEPEND) among the six potential antecedents. 
Additionally, the table also reveals the relationship between the degree of collaboration and 
the performance of collaboration. First, all of the three factors for the degree of collaboration 
(Items 7, 8, and 9 in the table) are positively correlated with the both factors of strategic 
performance: economic contribution (DF1_PERFORM) and organizational capacity growth 
(DF2_PERFORM). Second, to the contrary, the results generally do not support  positive 
influences of the degree of collaboration on the other two dimensions of direct performance, i.e., 
the effectiveness (%ACHIEVED) and the efficiency (EFFICIENT) of a partnership. The 
exception is the positive and significant correlation (r=.265, p<.01) between commitment 
(MF1_COMMITMENT) and effectiveness (%ACHIEVED).  
 [   Table 4 about here  ] 
Table 5 presents the results of multivariable regressions to test the direct effects of 
contextual, relational, and institutional attributes on the degree of collaboration (H1). The 
regression models include control variables (ΔUNEMPLOY and IMPORTANCE). Overall, the 
regression models are fairly specified. The F-values are statistically significant in all models and 
the adjusted R2 statistics range between 10.5 percent (Model 3) and 61.4 percent (Model 1). The 
multivariate regressions report the following findings.  
[   Table 5 about here  ] 
First, resource dependence on partners (IF1_RESDEPEND) negatively affects commitment 
to mutual goals and relationships (MF1_COMMITMENT), but positively affects the 
effectiveness of formal joint meetings (MF3_GROUPMEET). This indicates that when partners 
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relying more on the others’ resources in a collaborative project may make less commitment. This 
is against my prediction that greater reliance on partners’ resources leads to greater commitment. 
The finding may suggest a possibility of an opportunistic behavior. For example, ex ante, a local 
government lacking certain resources may well make commitment to establishing a partnership 
with others with the resources, which is consistent with the prior literature (Krueger & McGuire, 
2005). Later once the partnership is established and thus resources are secured, the position may 
change; it may be less committed to the partnership operation because the local government’s 
equity in the partnership is relatively lesser. On the other hand, the positive association found in 
Model 3 supports H1a. However, the two opposite observations are not incompatible. In 
particular, despite the observed potential change in the level of commitment, greater reliance on 
partners’ resources still encourages a partner to benefit from the outcomes and decisions of 
formal joint meetings.  
Second, geographical proximity among participating local governments (GEOPROXI) 
displays similar behaviors with resource dependence. However, the statistical significance rests 
only in Model 3 (β=.204, p<.10), which makes a complete sense in that more frequent joint 
meetings are held to generate more practical ideas for collaboration. Thus, the finding weakly 
supports H1b.  
Third, the effect of socio-political similarities (SOCPOLSIMIL) does not fully support H2c. 
In part, the positive, albeit marginally significant (p=0.107), coefficient in Model 1 supports the 
prediction that greater similarities in social and political backgrounds shared among the heads of 
local governments allow greater commitment. However, it seems that similarities do not 
necessarily help to improve the quality of communication executed at a hands-on staffs. All in 
all, the findings suggest very limited effect of the social connections, in either directions. 
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Fourth, the results pertaining to the perceived competitive relationship (IF2_COMPET) with 
partners partly support H1d. In Model 1, the coefficient on IF2_COMPET shows a positive 
association with the participant’s commitment to mutual relationships and goals, which is 
contrary to my prediction. The positive association may illustrate the complementarity of 
resources. To understand this perspective, it should be noted that local governments in a 
competitive relation likely have economic and industrial resources of similar kinds. For this 
reason, they may recognize the complementarity of their resources for an effective partnership. 
Fifth, greater trust in partners (IF3_TRUST) and well-constructed institutions 
(IF4_INSTITUTION) may improve the quality of collaboration process by enhancing 
commitments to mutual goals and relationships and communication among participants. The 
findings strongly support H1e and H1f. 
5.2. Mediating Effects of the Degree of Collaboration  
Hypothesis 3 examines the mediating effects of the degree of collaboration on the 
performance of collaboration. To show the mediating role of a variable, this study employs a 
conventional procedure recommended by Baron and Kenny (1986). The procedure is done in 
three steps: (1) regressing the dependent variable (i.e., performance of collaboration) on the 
independent variables (i.e., contextual, relational and institutional attributes), (2) regressing the 
mediators (i.e., degree of collaboration) on the independent variables, and (3) regressing the 
dependent variable on both the mediators and the independent variables. To establish that the 
mediator mediates the relationship of independent variable and dependent variable, the following 
conditions must hold. First, the independent variable must have significant effects on the 
dependent variable in the first regression. Second, it should be shown that the independent 
variable also affects a potential mediator in the second regression. Third, it is critical part of the 
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analysis to see whether the effect of the mediator on the dependent variable exists even when an 
independent variable is controlled for and, at the same time and whether the effect of an 
independent variable is mitigated when the mediator is introduced. If these conditions hold, a 
mediation effect is deemed to exist. The full mediation is a special case for when the effect of the 
independent variable is completely eliminated (i.e., no longer significant) in the final step (Baron 
& Kenny, 1986; Choi, 2009).  
Following the Baron and Kenny’s procedure, this section runs three sets of regressions in a 
hierarchical way to examine whether the first and third conditions for mediation hold. In the 
preceding section, the multivariate regressions in Table 5 report that all independent variables 
affect at least one of the suspected mediating factors, which validates the relationships required 
for the second mediation condition.  
In this study, a set of control variables (UNEMPLOY and IMPORTANCE) are first entered 
(Model 1). Then, Model 2 adds independent variables (IF1_RESDEPEND, GEOPROXI, 
SOCPOLSIMIL, IF2_COMPET, IF3_TRUST, and IF4_INSTITUTION) to the regression, and 
tests their effects on the dependent variable for the performance of collaboration (either 
DF1_PERFORM or DF2_PERFORM). These two regression models assess the impact of the 
independent variables on the performance of collaboration, after controlling for the influence of 
control variables. They examine whether the first condition for mediation holds. Finally, the 
three mediating factors (MF1_COMMITMENT, MF2_QUAL_COMM, and 
MF3_GROUTMEET) are added to the second regression equation to form Model 3 where, if 
any, the presence of a mediation effect may be confirmed.  
[   Table 6 about here  ] 
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Table 6 presents the results of the hierarchical regression analysis against two strategic 
performance factors, i.e., economic contribution (DF1_PERFORM) and capacity growth 
(DF2_PERFORM).12 Panel A of Table 6 reports the results from the hierarchical regressions of 
economic contribution (DF1_PERFORM). In general, the findings suggest some mediation 
effects of the degree of collaboration. Model 1 illustrates that the control variables 
(UNEMPLOY and IMPORTANCE) account for 5 percent of the variance in economic 
contribution. However, only UNEPLOY makes a statistically significant contribution to the 
model. The addition of the six independent variables in Model 2 significantly improves the 
estimation of economic contribution. The independent variables explain an additional 16.2% of 
the variance in economic contribution (F-stat for ΔR2 =2.189, p<.01), even when the effects of 
the control variables are statistically controlled for. However, only two variables out of six are 
statistically significant: IF1_RESDEPEND (β=.334, p<.01) and IF3_TRUST (β=.184, p<.05). 
The findings support the direct effect of some independent variables on economic contribution. 
The earlier test of the relationship between independent variables and mediators (see Table 5) 
finds that IF1_RESDEPEND and IF3_TRUST are statistically significant predictors of the 
degree of collaboration. In sum, Model 2 and the previous results reported in Table 5 satisfy the 
first two necessary conditions for a mediation effect. In Model 3 with the three mediators 
entered, the two independent variables that are significant in Model 2 do not show significant 
associations with DF1_PERFORM any longer. In contrast, the mediators are robust to display 
significant relationships with DF1_PERFORM. The findings suggest that the direct effects of 
these two independent variables (IF1_RESDEPEND and IF3_TRUST) are completely 
undermined by those of the mediators, i.e., the full mediation. Moreover, the three mediators 
                                                            
12 The direct performance of a partnership will be discussed later in the section. 
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account for an additional 10.2 % to the variance in economic contribution, which is statistically 
significant (F-stat for ΔR2 = 4.456, p<.01). These findings together provide strong support for the 
mediation effect argument that the degree of collaboration fully mediates the effects of resource 
dependence on partners (IF1_RESDEPEND) and trust in partners (IF3_TRUST) on the 
performance of collaboration in economic contribution. Consequently, it indicates that greater 
resource dependence on partners and trust in partners increases the degree of collaboration that, 
in turn, contributes to higher performance in terms of the economic contribution of interlocal 
collaboration.  
Panel B of Table 6 shows the results from the hierarchical regression analysis against the 
second performance factor, i.e., capacity growth (DF2_PERFORM). Similar to the previous 
results for DF1_PERFORM, it also identifies the mediation effects of the degree of collaboration 
on DF2_PERFORM. In Model 1 of the second hierarchical regression analysis, none of the 
variables explains the variation in capacity growth. On the other hand, the inclusion of the six 
independent variables significantly improves the explanatory power by 22% (F-stat for ΔR2= 
4.489, p<.01). However, only IF3_TRUST (β=.376, p<.01) and IF4_INSTITUTION (β=.279, 
p<.01) pick up statistical significance. As shown in the preceding test (see Table 5), these two 
factors are found to be associated with the degree of collaboration (MF1_COMITMENT and 
MF2_QUAL_COMM), which satisfies the second condition for mediation. However, the 
significant direct effects of IF3_TRUST and IF4_INSTITUTION disappear in Model 3, as the 
three mediators are introduced with additional explanatory power of 7.2% (F-stat for ΔR2=3.231, 
p<0.05). Unlike the results for DF1_PERFORM, the analysis for DF2_PERFORM presents 
significance only for two mediators that are related to communication. This suggests that 
commitment to the current partnership project(s) does not necessarily expand the organizational 
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capacity but effective communication makes the contribution. Finally, in Model 3, 
SOCPOLSIMIL gains significance but the effect is marginal (p<.10). Considering all together, 
these findings support that the effects of trust in partners (IF3_TRUST) and the level of 
institutionalization (IF4_INSTITUTION) on the strategic performance of collaboration in terms 
of a local government’s organizational capacity growth (DF2_PERFORM) is mediated by the 
effectiveness of communication both in overall communication (MF2_QUAL_COMM) and 
through formal joint meetings (MF3_GROUPMEET). It means that a greater level of trust and 
institutionalization can increase commitment and communication that, in turn, contribute to local 
capacity growth for economic development.  
In addition to the indirect strategic performance of collaboration (i.e., economic contribution 
and capacity growth), the direct performance of collaboration is examined. However, the results 
are not tabulated because the hierarchical regressions against partnership effectiveness 
(%ACHIEVED) and efficiency (EFFICIENT) do not provide any meaningful implications. In 
particular, none of the three mediating factors and the independent variables turns out to be 
associated with these measures of direct performance. Furthermore, all the regression models 
show little explanatory power; adjusted R2 statistics range from 0.5 percent to 7.9 percent at best. 
It indicates that the models hardly explain any effects on partnership effective and efficiency 
performance. The poor model specification may, presumably, arise from other potentially critical 
determinants of the direct performance that have not been discussed in this study. Alternate 
sources of variations in the direct performance might include local government’s financial 
independence from a central government, local government financial capacity (e.g., local 
government level- upper or lower), and a project’s characteristics such as the length of a project. 
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Even other environmental/economic factors such as a general national or global economic 
situation might be other important determinants of the immediate performance of a partnership.  
6. Conclusion and Discussion 
This study investigates the conditions under which participants are willing to be more 
collaborative and examines whether more collaborative process serves its purposes, leading to 
the achievement of the shared goals that, in this study’s specific context, are mostly relevant to 
economic prosperity of local governments in collaboration. To that end, this study conducts a 
nation-wide survey over local officials and collects a unique set of data regarding interlocal 
partnerships created mainly for local economic development in Korea.  
6.1. Summary of Findings and Discussion 
First, this study finds a set of factors facilitating collaboration. They include resource 
dependence on partners, geographical proximity, perceived competition, trust in partners, and the 
level of institutionalization for the partnership. All of them show significant positive 
relationships with at least one of the factors of the degree of collaboration, as expected. Among 
them, trust in partners and the level of institutionalization for the partnership appear to be the key 
determinants that, consistently and significantly, affect participants’ commitment to mutual 
relationships and goals, and the quality of communication to enhance consensus building and 
information exchange. Looking further into the relationships, it is also notable that trust shows a 
stronger association with the level of commitment than institutionalization, while 
institutionalization has a stronger association with the quality of communication than trust does. 
It suggests that trust matters the most in promoting commitment and institutionalization matters 
the most in building effective communication.  
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On the other hand, unlike the consistent and clear implications of trust and 
institutionalization, some findings require more careful interpretations. First, resource 
dependence positively affects the effectiveness of formal group meetings but negatively affects 
commitment to mutual goals and relationship. Its negative effect on commitment may suggest an 
alternative explanation. In particular, the observation may describe a local government’s 
opportunism, suggesting that parties with relatively less resource might act opportunistically 
once a partnership that they eagerly have pursued is established. Second, social and political 
similarity has an effect opposite to the expectation, showing that social capital established among 
governors or mayors of participating local governments might not necessarily play a positive role 
in sharing information for better collaboration. The reason for the result is still questionable and 
thus requires further investigation. Third, perceived competition has a negative effect on 
communication, as expected but has a positive effect on commitment, contrary to the 
expectation. A plausible alternative explanation for this result comes from the complementarity 
of industrial or economic resources that local governments in competition likely possess in 
common. In particular, it is worth attention that local governments in a competitive relation 
likely have similar representative industries. Because of the overlap of economic resources, they 
may be more willing to make greater commitment to common economic goals, perhaps to 
achieve greater economies of scale. However, this does not exclude other possibilities.  
Second, the principal test of this study regards the mediating effect of the degree of 
collaboration on the relationship between contextual, relational, and institutional factors and the 
performance of collaboration. This study provides support for full (partial) mediation of the 
degree of collaboration on the relationship between the resource dependence and trust (trust and 
the level of institutionalization) and the performance in economic contribution (the performance 
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in capacity growth). However, it does not find any associations with direct performance 
measures of a partnership—i.e., in effectiveness and efficiency. The result is yet inconclusive 
because it is highly subject to many other influential factors that can hardly be disentangled from 
the effect of collaboration. Potentially, the inconclusive result might have stemmed from the 
weakness of a survey research. The survey items about the two measures of direct performance 
are intended to ask local officials to evaluate each of their interlocal collaborative projects at the 
level of a partnership. However, it is still probable that some respondents aggregate their 
evaluation of several projects under their management to provide a single response instead of 
several responses, which may have introduced a noise into the measure. More importantly, the 
responses are not free from a bias due to the nature of subjective evaluation. In this regard, it 
could have been better to obtain any object, hard data about the direct economic performance of 
a partnership project. However, to my best knowledge, it is not available at least publicly or 
hardly collected in a systematic manner.  
6.2. Implication and Contribution 
The findings from this study are important for the following reasons. First, it suggests three 
dimensions of collaboration, demonstrating that the degree of collaboration among participants 
can be measured by three key factors. Collaboration is an abstract, complex, and 
multidimensional concept and there is still lack of consensus even among scholars in public 
administration and management (Thomson et al. 2007). In this regard, the key implication of this 
study is to identify the key elements of collaboration and provide plausible measures of the 
degree of collaboration. The measures discussed in this study encompass the key elements of 
five dimensions of collaboration process (i.e., governance, administration, autonomy, mutuality, 
and norms) empirically identified by Thomson et al. (2007). Thereby, this study contributes to 
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future research on collaborative governance and interlocal or intergovernmental relations, 
providing how to identify the key elements of collaborative process or the intensity of 
collaborative relationships. Furthermore, it also provides a practical guideline for policy makers 
and public managers to better understand the diverse aspects of collaboration to improve 
performance of collaborative projects. Especially, it will help local governments in Korea, where 
interlocal collaboration is at a beginning state, to find effective collaborative decision-making 
and implementation for better performance.       
Second, it provides evidence about our conventional belief that the relational capital (or 
social capital) established through better and stronger collaborative efforts can lead to better 
collective outcomes, which can be applied to other areas of collaboration. In particular, 
collaboration has a positive effect on strategic performance. The finding suggests that greater 
commitment to current collaborative projects can not only contribute to overall local economy, 
but also increase the capacity or potential to accomplish other (future) projects for local 
economic development. In other words, a successful collaboration experience (with positive 
strategic performance), in turn, may lead to trust building among previous partners, consequently 
contribute to greater collaboration among them and eventually improve performance in 
subsequent collaboration projects. This virtuous circle may produce and accumulate social 
capital among partners of repeated collaborative relationships.  
6.3. Limitation  
While this study makes important contributions to the collaboration literature, some 
potential limitations should be noted. First of all, it has relatively a small sample size. It concerns 
with issues related to the degree of freedom and statistical power, limiting the number of 
variables that can be used in statistical analyses. Had it been in a larger sample size (at least 200 
38 
 
or more13), the Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) technique could have been applied for a 
more rigorous analysis on the complex relationships among independent, mediating and 
dependent variables. Second, a limitation pertains to the use of only Korean data, although the 
variables constructed from the concepts explaining a general interlocal relationship. The findings 
in this study may be sensitive to cultural, institutional, or administrational sources that are unique 
in Korea. So, evidence under other environments or from analyses of a large dataset may expand 
the validity of the findings in this study. Third, the evaluation of local officials supervising, as 
opposed to simply being engaged in, collaborative projects might be meaningful because it can 
measure collaboration process and outcomes more directly. However, it is still subject to 
measurement issues arising from self-evaluation of collaboration and performance: for example, 
biases due to subjectivity and incomparability. 
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Appendix I: Survey Questionnaire 
Demographic information 
1. Age: ① 20’s  ② 30’s  ③ 40’s  ④ 50’s or older 
2. Gender: ① Male ② Female  
3. Local government:  
4. Position (Department):  
5. Years in the current department: (        years          months)   
6. The level of local government 
a. Metropolitan city (Gwangyeok-si)  
b. Province (Do)  
c. City with population of more than 5 hundred thousand (Si)  
d. City with population of less than 5 hundred thousand (Si)  
e. Autonomous ward (autonomous Gu) 
f. County (Gun) 
7. Interlocal collaboration projects you are involved: 
8. Partner local governments in the collaboration projects: 
9. Project period: From (        ) To (         ) 
10. Total project budget: 
11. Type of institutional arrangement for collaboration: 
12. Project area (e.g., industrial district development, tourism, R&D): 
13. Partnership organization for coordination and management:   
 
I. Institutionalization level for collaboration (a five point Likert scale; from 1=”not at all” to 
5= “to a great extent”) 
1. Authorities of participating government agencies are clearly assigned   
2. Roles and responsibilities of actors (i.e., individuals) are clearly defined 
3. How to resolve the conflicts among participating institutions is well defined 
4. Policy and decision making process and methods are clearly defined 
5. Common goals, objectives, and visions of collaborative projects are well defined 
6. The director selection process is transparently and rationally defined 
7. Promotion process is transparently and rationally defined   
II. The evaluation on the relationship with partners and collaborative process (a five point 
Likert scale; from 1=”not at all” to 5= “to a great extent”) 
1. The communication with your partner helps to build consensus 
2. The consensus building process with your partner helps to facilitate mutual understanding 
3. You are willing to share information with your partner 
4. Your partner are willing to share information with you 
5. High-quality information for successful collaboration is exchanged in collaborative process. 
6. You make a strong effort to address, if any, conflicts with your partner 
7. Your partner make a strong effort to address, if any, conflicts with you 
8. The conflicts with your partner are resolved in a satisfactory manner 
9. You make an effort to promote a good relationship with your partner 
10. Your partner make an effort to promote a good relationship with you 
11. The relation with your partner is being improved through effective collaborative process 
12. You is effectively responded to your partner’s demands 
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13. Your partner is effectively responded to your demands 
14. You ensure your partner’s compliance to the agreement 
15. You trust that your partner will react in a collaborative manner to your collaborative response 
16. You trust that your partner has an ability to perform your collaborative project 
17. You trust that your partner will not act opportunistically 
18. You trust that the profits obtained from the collaborative projects will be fairly distributed to 
participating local governments 
19. You think you receive reliable (confidential) information and service 
20. You pursue common goals of collaborative project, rather than your own goals 
21. Your partner pursue common goals of collaborative project, rather than his/her own goals 
22. You often meet or contact with your partner 
23. Newly obtained information is immediately shared with your partner 
24. You often have formal group meetings with your partner (e.g., a task-force team meeting or 
joint group meeting) to generate and develop new ideas or plans 
25. You often have communication with your partner through informal channels 
26. The ideas or plans generated through group meetings are accepted and implemented 
27. The group meetings have contributed to the success of collaborative project 
28. Your local government are in completion with your partner to attract investment for local 
economic development 
III. Resource dependence for interlocal collaboration 
Suppose that 100% indicates the resources including financial, personnel, and managerial 
capacity mobilized by your government and partners to complete a targeted project.  
1. Please indicate how much of the required resource is available to your own government.  
2. How much are you dependent on partner’s resources? (a five point Likert scale) 
3. To what extent the partner’s resource is needed to accomplish the project? (a five point 
Likert scale) 
 
IV. Interlocal collaboration performance 
1. To what extent (in percentage) of targeted goals of the partnership have you achieved?  
2. What is the ratio of output over input in your partnership? 
 
The following questions are evaluated based on a five point Likert scale 
3. The primary goal of the partnership to develop the local economy has been achieved more, 
compared with other economic projects. 
4. The partnership has contributed to the development of your local economy more, compared 
with other economic projects. 
5. The project has contributed to general local economic development in your own local 
government. 
6.  The partnership has contributed to other (current or future) local businesses development in 
your own government. 
7. The partnership has contributed to the increase in the region’s capacity for economic 
development. 
8. Your local government has obtained a lot of knowledge about local development strategies 
through this collaborative project. 
9. Your local government will initiate many new local development projects based on the 
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knowledge learned from this project. 




























Table 1: Demographic Characteristics of Survey Respondents (N=102) 
 
Category   Frequency % 
Forms of Institutional 
Arrangement for Interlocal 
Collaboration  
Local Government Association (LGA) 33  (47) 
32.30% 
(15.7%) 
PC (Partnership Contract) 57  (221) 
55.90% 
(73.6%) 
ACC (Administrative Consultative Council) 12  (32) 
11.80% 
(10.7%) 
    
Age 30’s 27 26.50% 
 40’s  48 47.10% 
 50’s or older 27 26.50% 
    
Position (Grade) 4 4 3.90% 
 5 5 4.90% 
 6 32 31.40% 
 7 43 42.20% 
 8 5 4.90% 
 9 4 3.90% 
 Researcher 8 7.80% 
 Not indicated 1 1.00% 
    
Length of Service for a 
Partnership 
Shorter than 12 months 34 33.30% 
Between 12 to 24 months 32 31.40% 
Longer than 24 months 33 32.40% 
Not indicated 3 2.90% 
    
Local Government Level    
 Upper-level  Province (Do) 26 25.50% 
 
Metropolitan city Population over 1,000,000 
31 30.40% (Gwangyeok-si)  
  57 55.90% 
 Lower-level 
(Municipality) City population 1,000,000-500,000 (Si) 4 3.90% 
 City population 500,000-150,000 (Si) 19 18.60% 
 County population less than 150,000 (Gun) 22 21.60% 
    45 44.10% 
Note: The number in parentheses of the column of frequency (percent) indicates the number 
(percent) of survey distributions (i.e., population) in terms of the forms of institutional 
arrangements.   
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Table 2: Measures of Research Variables 
 
Construct Variable  Description Measurement 
Independent Variables: Physical/Contextual, Relational, and Institutional Attributes) 
Resource 
dependence 







PTNDEP Dependence on partner's resource QIII-2 
PTNNEED Needs for partner's resources QIII-3 
Geographical 
proximity 
GEOPROXI Geographical proximity a Naver Map 
Social/political 
similarity 






COMPET Perceived competitive relation QII-28  
Trust in partners RELIABLE_1 Reliability about partner’s compliance to the 
agreement 
QII-14 
RELIABLE_2 Partner’s ability to perform the collaborative 
project 
QII-16 
FAIR Fairness about collaboration profit distribution  QII-18 
GW_1 Good will associated with norms of reciprocity QII-15 
GW_2 Not opportunistic act  QII-17 
GW_3 Reliable information/service provision  QII-19 
The level of 
Institutionalization 
AUTHORITY Authority assignment QI-1 
TASKDISTR Task distribution QI-2 
CONFRESOL Conflict resolution QI-3 
DECPROC Decision-making process QI-4 
GOALDEF Goal definition QI-5 
LEADER Leadership QI-6 
PROMO Promotion QI-7. 
Mediators: The Degree of Collaboration 
Communication FREQ_CONT General contact frequency with partner QII-22 
CONSENSUSBLD Effective communication for consensus building 
process  
QII-1 
UNDERSTAND Mutual understanding facilitation  QII-2 
OWILLINFOSH Willingness to share information  QII-3 
 PWILLINFOSH Partner’s willingness to share information QII-4 
HQLTYINFOSH High quality information provision QII-5 
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QUICKINFOSH Immediately new information sharing QII-23 
FREQ_MEET Communication frequency through formal group 
meetings   
QII-24 
IDEAACCEPT Group idea implementation  QII-26 
MTGHELPFUL Group meeting’s effectiveness  QII-27 
Commitment OE_CONFRESOL Efforts for conflict resolution  QII-6 
PE_CONFRESOL Partner’s effort for conflict resolution QII-7 
OE_RELATION Efforts to promote a good relationship  QII-9 
PE_RELATION Partner’s efforts to promote a good relationship QII-10 
RELIMPROVE Relation improvement QII-11 
OR_DEMAND Respond to partner’s demands  QII-12 
PR_DEMAND Partner’s respond to my demands QII-13 
OGOALCOM Common goal pursuit QII-20 
PGOALCOM Partner’s common goal pursue  QII-21 
Dependent Variables: Performance of Collaboration 
Partnership 
effectiveness  





EFFICIENT The ratio of output over input of the partnership QIV-2 
Economic 
contribution 
RELPERFORM Overall economic performance (relative to other 
projects) 
QIV-3.  
CONTRIBECON Contribution to local economy (relative to other 
projects) 
QIV-4.  
ABSPERFORM Overall economic performance QIV-5.  
 CONTRIBOTH Contribution to the growth of other relevant 
businesses 
QIV-6.  
Capacity Growth CAPAINCR Capacity increase QIV-7 
LEARNING Learning strategic knowledge QIV-8 
KNOWLTRANS Knowledge transfer QIV-9 
INNOVATION Innovation QIV-10 
Control Variables    
Local economic 
status 






IMPORTANCE Relative size of the partnership d Korean Local 
Finance Open 
System 
Note: a geographical distance between a pair of local governments in the partnership*-1, b Average of the 
similarity score for each pair with respect to five social/political factors of hometown,  education 
background,  college alma mater, previous profession, and political parties (1= counterparts in a pair of 
local government are same in each demographic element,  0 otherwise), c Average unemployment rate 
for 5 years from 2009 to 2013, and d the ratio of a total expense of the partnership to a total amount of 
budget of a local government.  
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Table 3: Factor Analysis Results and Reliability Test Results 
 
Panel A: Rotated Component Matrix of Independent Variables 
Variables Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
PTNAVAIL 0.608 -0.562 -0.083 0.004 
PTNDEP 0.711 0.01 -0.229 0.04 
PTNNEED 0.783 0.303 0.23 -0.092 
COMPET 0.202 0.759 -0.231 0.011 
RELIABLE_1 -0.074 0.051 0.813 0.362 
RELIABLE_2 -0.045 -0.019 0.764 0.372 
FAIR -0.096 -0.002 0.786 0.293 
GW_1 -0.102 -0.017 0.794 0.39 
GW_2 -0.01 -0.187 0.782 0.212 
GW_3 0.108 -0.171 0.742 0.351 
AUTHORITY 0.166 0.029 0.266 0.773 
TASKDISTR 0.084 0.041 0.358 0.79 
CONFRESOL 0.048 -0.148 0.191 0.762 
DECPROC -0.173 -0.165 0.255 0.781 
GOALDEF -0.051 0.157 0.281 0.75 
LEADER -0.074 0.159 0.33 0.729 
PROMO -0.09 -0.088 0.305 0.647 





Label IF1_ IF2_ IF3_ IF4_ RESDEPEND COMPET TRUST INSTITUTION 
Eigenvalue 1.7 1.2 4.4 4.6 
% of 
Variance 9.71% 6.82% 25.89% 27.15% 





Table 3: Factor Analysis Results and Reliability Test Results (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Rotated Component Matrix of Mediating Variables 
Variables Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
CONSENSUSBLD 0.381 0.727 0.123 
UNDERSTAND 0.441 0.711 0.061 
OWILLINFOSH 0.386 0.821 0.113 
PWILLINFOSH 0.286 0.873 0.04 
HQLTYINFOSH 0.273 0.829 0.136 
QUICKINFOSH 0.286 0.618 0.223 
FREQ_CONT 0.543 a 0.434 0.19 
OE_CONFRESOL 0.523 0.477 0.16 
PE_CONFRESOL 0.498 0.666 b 0.13 
OE_RELATION 0.843 0.264 0 
PE_RELATION 0.779 0.429 0.016 
RELIMPROVE 0.786 0.275 0.107 
OR_DEMAND 0.819 0.346 0.065 
PR_DEMAND 0.751 0.408 0.07 
OGOALCOM 0.715 0.277 0.222 
PGOALCOM 0.649 0.322 0.277 
FREQ_MEET 0.063 0.041 0.812 
IDEAACCEPT 0.106 0.199 0.917 
MTGHELPFUL 0.161 0.132 0.909 
Description Commitment to mutual relationships and goals 
Effective communication 
for consensus building 
and information sharing 
Effective formal joint 
meetings 
Label MF1_COMMITMENT MF2_QUAL_COMM MF3_GROUPMEET 
Eigenvalue 5.7 5.3 2.7 
% of Variance 29.92% 27.64% 13.97% 
Cronbach’s α 0.94 0.93 0.89 
Note: a. The question for FREQ_CONT is originally developed for the quality of   communication, but 
is grouped into MF1_COMMITMENT. b. The question for PE_CONFRESOL is originally developed 




Table 3: Factor Analysis Results and Reliability Test Results (Continued) 
Panel C: Component Matrixes of Strategic Performance 
Economic Contribution 





Description Economic Contribution 
Label DF1_PERFORM 
Eigenvalue 2.9 
% of Variance 73% 
Cronbach’s α 0.88 
Capacity Growth 





Description Capacity Growth 
Label DF2_PERFORM 
Eigenvalue 3.2 
% of Variance 80% 
Cronbach’s α 0.92 
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Table 4: Bivariate Correlations 
 













1. IF1_RESDEPEND 0 1.0               
2. GEOPROXI -74.6 70.5 -.047              
3. SOCPOLSIMIL .4 .2 -.050 .423**             
4. IF2_COMPET 0 1.0 .000 -.028 .003            
5. IF3_TRUST 0 1.0 .000 -.025 -.149 .000           










 7. MF1_COMMITMENT 0 1.0 -.127 -.184 -.111 .098 .724** .259**         
8. MF2_QUAL_COMM 0 1.0 .013 -.156 -.226* -.187 .210* .492** .000        










10. %ACHIEVED 59.5 27.5 -.036 -.254* -.235* .171 .162 .131 .265** -.031 .028      
11. EFFICIENT 13.1 43.0 -.048 -.017 -.112 -.003 -.028 -.182 -.057 .015 -.181 -.120     
12. DF1_PERFORM 0 1.0 .204* -.117 -.030 .074 .314** .189 .255** .251* .268** .240* .079    










 14. UNEMPLOY 2.6 1.1 .143 -.138 .122 .126 -.061 .151 -.064 -.078 .006 .081 .148 .214* .132  
15. IMPORTANCE .3 .5 -.083 .283** .421** .040 -.206* -.019 -.256** -.061 -.257** -.284** .010 .002 -.007 .343** 
 




Table 5: The Direct Effects on the Degree of Collaboration 
 
     The Degree of Collaboration 
  H1 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
MF1_COMMITMENT MF2_QUAL_COMM MF3_GROUPMEET 
    Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
IF1_RESDEPEND a (+) -0.131 -2.080** 0.034 0.405 0.225 2.337**
GEOPROXI b (+) -0.105 -1.393 0.055 0.543 0.204 1.780*
SOCPOLSIMIL c (+) 0.119 1.627a -0.186 -1.900* -0.131 -1.179
IF2_COMPET d (−) 0.105 1.683* -0.172 -2.061** 0.069 0.730
IF3_TRUST e (+) 0.711 11.188*** 0.198 2.326** 0.021 0.220
IF4_INSTITUTION f (+) 0.239 3.596*** 0.511 5.741*** 0.175 1.731*
UNEMPLOY   -0.037 -0.522 -0.133 -1.417 0.074 0.687
IMPORTANCE   -0.128 -1.695* 0.108 1.067 -0.261 -2.269**
R2   0.645  0.363  0.176  
Adjusted R2   0.614  0.308  0.105  
F-stat   21.081***  6.629***  2.485**  
*p<.10, ** p<.05, ***p<.01 





Table 6: The Mediating Effects of the Degree of Collaboration on the Performance of 
Collaboration 
Panel A: Economic Contribution 
  
Dependent Variable: Economic Contribution (DF1_PERFORM) 
Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 
Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
UNEMPLOY 0.242 2.318** 0.156 1.493 0.196 1.934
IMPORTANCE -0.081 -0.776 0.032 0.288 0.111 0.996
IF1_RESDEPEND   0.184 1.96** 0.15 1.607
GEOPROXI   -0.047 -0.418 -0.092 -0.842
SOCPOLSIMIL   0.034 0.313 0.102 0.953
IF2_COMPET   0.052 0.562 0.06 0.668
IF3_TRUST   0.334 3.533*** 0.017 0.104
IF4_INSTITUTION   0.154 1.556 -0.166 -1.191
MF1_COMMITMENT     0.334 1.893*
MF2_QUAL_COMM     0.369 2.812***
MF3_GROUPMEET         0.292 2.925***
ΔR2     0.162   0.102   
F-stat for ΔR2    2.189***  4.456***  
R2 0.051 0.213 0.315 
Adjusted R2 0.032 0.146 0.231 
F-stat 2.687*  3.153***  3.764***  
* p<.10, ** p<.05, ***p<.01 
Note: At the bottom of the table, the change in R2 between models (∆R2) assesses the additional 
explanatory power of a set of independent variables in Model 2 and a set of mediators in Model 3 
respectively. All independent variables have tolerance values of greater than .20 and variance inflation 







Table 6: The Mediating Effects of the Degree of Collaboration on the Performance of 
Collaboration (Continued) 
 
Panel B: Capacity Growth 
  
Dependent Variable: Capacity Growth (DF2_PERFORM) 
Model 1 Model 2  Model 3 
Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat Coeff. t-stat 
UNEMPLOY 0.152 1.436 0.068 0.661 0.09 0.889
IMPORTANCE -0.06 -0.563 0.018 0.166 0.073 0.65
IF1_RESDEPEND   0.062 0.67 0.013 0.135
GEOPROXI   -0.04 -0.366 -0.093 -0.856
SOCPOLSIMIL   0.112 1.049 0.181 1.692*
IF2_COMPET   0.08 0.875 0.095 1.046
IF3_TRUST   0.376 4.055*** 0.222 1.322
IF4_INSTITUTION   0.279 2.871*** 0.063 0.453
MF1_COMMITMENT     0.134 0.759
MF2_QUAL_COMM     0.272 2.068**
MF3_GROUPMEET         0.256 2.557***
ΔR2     0.22   0.072   
F-stat for ΔR2   4.489***  3.132**  
R2 0.02 0.24 0.312 
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.175 0.228 
F-stat 1.034  3.680***  3.714***  
* p<.10, ** p<.05, ***p<.01 
 
 
